



Joint Contracting Command Iraq / Afghanistan *The Way Ahead...*

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



Standing up JCC-I/A


Establish a JMD to resource and sustain the command

Integrate with Joint Force Commander and organize to support his campaign plan

Mission to centralize contracting in Iraq
FRAGO 09-680



JCC-I/A Evolution





Operational Contracting C² Issues

FACT: No one contracting agency has oversight over all agencies executing contracts in theater

INSCOM

SOCCENT

CENTAF

AFSC

AFCEE

Operational Effects

- Inaccurate and untimely Situational Awareness of contracting activities
- Lack of ability to enforce command-wide contracting policies
- Inability to achieve unity of contracting effort to support the warfighter
- Difficulty managing and directing contractor accountability & arming

Recent MNF-I FRAGOs dealing with Contractors

- Trafficking
- Contractor Accountability
- Arming Contractors & PSCs

GOAL: All Contracting Activities in Theater align to support CJOA Commanders Objectives



Incorporating Lessons Learned

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Lessons Learned

The Joint Contracting Command Model WORKS!

- **Flag officer** required to engage Host Nation leadership, Embassy Staff, COCOM, and MSC's (Large Scale, Long Term Operations)
- **HCA** forward with the warfighter improves responsive support
- Each Services **strengths** and **weaknesses** highlighted
- The "**Joint Team**" provides theater-wide critical expertise for complex acquisitions and direct support to Brigade Combat Teams
- **Centralized contracting** support provides more capability, flexibility and responsiveness
- **Host Nation Capacity Building** supports transition to self-reliance
- Provides **extensive knowledge** of vendors, Host Nation leadership, Embassy and NGO players
- **Rotation period** of less than 6 months is counterproductive
- A single contracting agency provides **theater-wide perspective** and oversight and a central contract clearing house

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO 4

- **Organization**
- **Policy**
- **Doctrine**

Army vs Joint

- **Training**
- **Engagement**

Army MACOMs
COCOMs
Sister Services



On Going Actions to...

...incorporate Lessons

Learned

- **Joint Contracting - Contractor Management Working Group**
 - Develop Joint Doctrine
 - Address Joint Policy on Contingency Contracting directed by the 2006 NDAA Defense Authorization
- **Developing Joint Contingency Contracting Training**
 - Supplemental Training Modules
 - CON 234 Refresher Course
 - Create a Joint DAU Course for Contingency Contracting Officers
- **Improving Joint Contingency Contracting**
 - SF44
 - Data Management
 - Contracting Writing
 - Contractor Accountability
- **Regulatory Improvements**
 - New Subpart 18
 - Update PGI 225.74


**Approval
for**

**Contracting
Joint Pub!**

**Leverage USAF
Ready Airman
Course**

BTA Tiger Team

What is Contingency Contracting?






**Questions
&
Comment
S...**



Lessons Learned

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Lessons Learned

- A Joint Contracting Command, with a **viable JMD**, should be integrated with initial flow of CS/CSS forces and grow it after cessation of major combat operations
- Implementation of **Procurement Automation Systems** must be planned for in advance and tailored to a contingency environment
- Better control over **contracts written from CONUS** is needed
 - Coordination of Logistics Support
- C2 of **“Contractors on the Battlefield”** is still a large challenge
 - Policies on Arming
 - Accountability
 - Logistics Support

Working these issues from “in theater” while supporting combat operations is tough!!